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The ew Americanists 
 
The New Americanists form a rather loose grouping of literary and 
cultural critics who in different ways oppose the presuppositions of 
the “Old” American Studies of the Cold War era, as embodied by the 
writings of Richard Chase, R.W.B. Lewis, Lionel Trilling, Leslie 
Fiedler, and others. The label “New Americanists” was first applied by 
Frederick Crews in an article for the ew York Review of Books in 
which he referred to a number of scholars (among them Donald Pease, 
Jane Tompkins, David Reynolds, Philip Fisher, Walter Benn Michaels, 
and Myra Jehlen) whose critical practices diverged markedly from and 
in many respects clashed with those of the previous generation 
through their joint focus on the ideological implications of American 
literature. (Crews 68-69) Crews intended the label “New 
Americanists” pejoratively, as he detected in these authors’ insistent 
questioning of the established canon of great American authors 
(especially those associated with the so-called “American 
Renaissance” of the mid-nineteenth century, a term introduced by F.O. 
Matthiessen in a 1941 study of the same name that counts as one of 
the master-texts of American Studies) an attempt to displace the old 
guard and assume a position of power in the academy.
2
 As happens so 
often with the rise of a new critical school (a term that hardly seems 
applicable to such a motley group of critics as the New Americanists), 
the label was internalized and transformed into a badge of pride after 
                                                      
1 Previously published in: Marietta Messmer and Armin Paul Frank, eds. The 
International Turn in American Studies. Frankfurt/Main and New York: Peter Lang 
Verlag. 
2 F.O. Matthiessen. American Renaissance: Art and Expression in the Age of Emerson 
and Whitman. London/New York: Oxford University Press, 1941. 
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Donald Pease slyly used Crews’s critique as his cue to introduce the 
widely-read 1990 special issue of Boundary 2 devoted to “The New 
Americanists: Revisionist Interventions into the Canon” (Pease, New 
Americanists 17, 1).
3
 
If we can discern a silver thread running through the 
contributions collected in that seminal Boundary 2 issue – it was 
reprinted four years later as the second volume of Pease’s New 
Americanists book series at Duke University Press but significantly 
without an explicit reference to the self-assertive identifier “New 
Americanists” in the title – , it is probably a shared commitment to 
teasing out the imperial implications of U.S. culture, which heretofore 
literary scholars had associated predominantly with the genre of the 
romance and what it evokes. (Pease, Revisionary Interventions) This 
shift from innocence to guilt, or from a belief in the “Adamic” nature 
(as in R.W.B. Lewis’s 1955 bestseller The American Adam) of 
American culture to a persistent questioning of its involvement in the 
spread of U.S. empire, becomes apparent if we compare the New 
Americanists’ dominant concerns to those of a prominent Americanist 
of the foregoing generation, Robert E. Spiller, who is best known as 
the editor-in-chief of the monumental Literary History of the United 
States (1948), a landmark publication that remained practically 
unrivalled in the field until the publication of Emory Elliot’s Columbia 
Literary History of the United States exactly four decades later. 
(Spiller, Letter 140) Towards the end of his career, when plans for a 
new history of American literature were on the table, Spiller looked 
back on the rise of American Studies as a legitimate struggle against a 
“lingering colonialism” supposedly ingrained in U.S. culture. (Letter 
140) In the Literary History of the United States, Spiller and his team 
had attempted to overcome this colonial complex by stressing the 
“cosmopolitan” (as opposed to the narrowly “Anglo-Saxon”) roots of 
American literature and by conceptualizing U.S. culture in terms of a 
series of waves beating in from the Atlantic but also rolling back to 
                                                      
3 It is interesting to note that the New Americanists appear more as a unified school in 
Europe than is the case in the United States. This can be explained by the strong 
institutional link between the Futures of American Studies Institute which Donald 
Pease directs at Dartmouth on the one hand, and, one of the most distinguished 
European centers of American Studies on the other, namely the John F. Kennedy-
Institut in Berlin. Another way of accounting for this optic illusion may have to do 
with the realization that presenting oneself as more marginal than one really is tends 
to make one appear more central than one really is.   
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the Old World. Spiller claimed that American literature had reached its 
first “literary fulfillment” when Emerson, Thoreau, Hawthorne, 
Whitman and Melville, the five authors Matthiessen had singled out 
for discussion in his American Renaissance, began to assert their 
intellectual independence from Europe.  
It is significant to note, given the New Americanists’ 
revisionist agenda, that even a sidelong glance at some of their most 
outstanding publications reveals a persistent preoccupation with 
precisely this handful of mid-nineteenth century writers. Donald 
Pease’s Visionary Compacts, David Reynolds’s Beneath the American 
Renaissance, John Carlos Rowe’s At Emerson’s Tomb, and oft-quoted 
multiple author collections such as The American Renaissance 
Reconsidered or Ideology and Classic American Literature direct their 
critical gaze for the most part, if not exclusively, to the authors 
canonized in the Spiller history.
4
 Even though Spiller’s wave theory of 
American literature, inspired for a large part by Vernon Louis 
Parrington’s Main Currents in American Thought and The 
Reinterpretation of American Literature edited by Norman Foerster, 
has long since fallen into disrepute because of a growing defiance of 
grand narratives; and even though his evolutionary philosophy has 
meanwhile been replaced by alternative, in some respects more 
sophisticated models – the leading New Americanists seem to have a 
predilection for French intellectuals such as Althusser, Lacan, and 
Foucault – , the continued investment in “classic” American literature 
has left Spiller’s original design relatively intact and thus testifies to 
its continuing institutional success.
5
 It is true that a number of 
formerly neglected or excluded authors have been foregrounded (e.g. 
                                                      
4 Donald E. Pease. Visionary Compacts: American Renaissance Writings in Cultural 
Context. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987; David S. Reynolds. Beneath 
the American Renaissance: The Subversive Imagination in the Age of Emerson and 
Melville. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988; John Carlos Rowe. At Emerson’s Tomb: 
The Politics of Classic American Literature. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1997; Walter Benn Michaels and Donald E. Pease, eds. The American Renaissance 
Reconsidered: Selected Papers from the English Institute, 1982-1983. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985; Sacvan Bercovitch and Myra Jehlen, eds. 
Ideology and Classic American Literature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1985. 
5 Vernon L. Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought. 3 Vols. New York: 
Harcourt, Brace & World, 1927-30; Norman Foerster, ed. The Reinterpretation of 
American Literature: Some Contributions toward the Understanding of Its Historical 
Development. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1928. 
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Frederick Douglass or Margaret Fuller), but the main difference 
between the New and the Old Americanists does not principally lie in 
the kind of authors that receive discussion but rather in the way their 
centrality is highlighted or asserted.
6
  
In his introduction to American Renaissance, Matthiessen 
famously asserted that his main reason for grouping together Emerson, 
Thoreau, Hawthorne, Melville, and Whitman, despite their obvious 
differences in terms of temperament and philosophy, had been these 
authors’ shared “devotion to the possibilities of democracy” 
(Matthiessen, American Renaissance ix). Spillers’s Literary History of 
the United States almost literally reproduces Matthiessen’s rationale 
when stating that all five authors address, however different the 
results, “the central goal and problem of democracy” (Spiller, Literary 
History 353). This assumption, fed to generations of American 
literature students, that the great American authors somehow embody 
the democratic principles of the American nation and its people, 
appeared as a dangerous incommensurability to the New 
Americanists, most of whom received their education in the 1960s and 
1970s when the foundations of American democracy were 
increasingly called into question by the democratization of higher 
education, the Civil Rights movement and the protests against the 
Vietnam war. The New Americanists no longer envision the rise of 
American literature in terms of a continuing struggle against (English, 
and, by extension, European) colonialism, but rather in terms of the 
imperial violence inflicted by the U.S. as an emergent neo-colonial 
world power on the rest of the world.  
While for Spiller and company mid-nineteenth century U.S. 
culture was associated with the growth of personal liberties and 
freedom, the New Americanists have reinterpreted that culture, often 
with interesting results, in light of Jackson’s Indian Removal policy, 
the “peculiar institution” of slavery, nativist hysteria against 
immigrants and Catholics, or Polk’s expansionist war against Mexico. 
This is particularly evident in Emerson criticism, where the standard-
bearer of Transcendentalism has been transformed from a leading 
spokesperson of democratic liberalism into a much more complex but 
                                                      
6 Significantly, Emory Elliot’s Columbia Literary History of the United States, which 
was profiled explicitly as a reaction against the Spiller history and the kind of master 
narrative it conveys, leaves Matthiessen’s original grouping intact in a section 
straightforwardly entitled “American Renaissance”. 
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also more dubious persona whose writings reflect or, according to 
some critics, even justify the ideological workings of imperialism. To 
give just one example, in his book The Emerson Effect Christopher 
Newfield argues that in his well-known essay “Self-Reliance” 
Emerson did not, as a long line of eminent Emerson critics suggests, 
embrace individualism and democracy but rather “consistently 
repudiated both at the same time” (Newfield 22). A similar reframing 
is noticeable in scholarship on other canonical authors as well. The 
central opposition between American democracy and European-style 
aristocracy, which for many decades structured critical debates on 
classic American literature, therefore seems to have been replaced by 
another guiding distinction, namely that between submission or 
resistance to Euro-American imperialism.   
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to evaluate the adequacy 
or inadequacy of this remarkable interpretative shift of American 
culture. What I hope to do, rather, is to show how this apparent 
inversion of values has taken shape. Niklas Luhmann’s social systems 
theory offers a sufficiently complex and worked-out framework for 
tracing this paradoxical dynamic. What bears remarking, from such a 
Luhmannian perspective, is not so much that the established literary 
canon and the dominant interpretations of it, as the New Americanists 
claim, should be revised because they would embody sexist, classist, 
racist and other values considered oppressive; the thing to note when 
it comes to the institutional logic of American Studies, is rather that 
this institution can continue to exist at all given all the above 
objections. Indeed, as indicated above, what is surprising is that, in 
spite of all the criticisms leveled against the authors sanctified by 
Matthiessen and Spiller, their writings have remained largely 
unchallenged at the center of the American canon. What is of interest, 
therefore, is not so much the supposed paradigm shift from self-
assertion to self-criticism, a conflict often dramatized as a form of 
patricide by “Old” and “New” Americanists alike, as the disciplinary 
dynamic of self-assertion through self-criticism. This dynamic, as I 
will argue, is by no means peculiar to the New Americanists but has 
characterized the field of American Studies from the beginning.  
 
Social Systems and the Functionalist Tradition 
 
The relative neglect in American universities of Niklas Luhmann’s 
social systems theory, which in Europe and elsewhere is commonly 
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regarded as one of the most ambitious attempts of the late twentieth 
century at grounding modern society in a comprehensive intellectual 
design, has been explained in terms of its high level of abstraction, 
often consciously fostered by Luhmann through his predilection for 
relatively obscure thinkers such as the mathematician George Spencer 
Brown, along with the translation problems involved in conveying the 
subtle ironies of Luhmann’s disengaged writing style. In the 
introductory note to the English-language edition of his principal work 
Soziale Systeme, which appeared more than a decade after the 
publication of the German original, Luhmann himself admitted rather 
dryly that what he had written was “not an easy book”. (Luhmann, 
Social Systems xxxvii)
7
 Characteristically, instead of mitigating this 
problem, Luhmann’s “Instead of a Preface” withholds from the reader 
any personal information on how he came to write the book, but 
instead elaborates on his systematic exclusion of the “subject” (or 
what Luhmann calls psychic systems) from the realm of the social. 
Yet, the willful complexity of Luhmann’s theory alone does not 
suffice to account for the reluctant reception of his work in the United 
States, all the more so because other major thinkers have of late found 
their way into the American humanities in spite of such obstacles 
(note, for instance, Hegel’s remarkable resurgence in postcolonial 
studies). 
What, in my opinion, makes Luhmann’s social systems theory 
particularly challenging in the American context is its reconciliation of 
an old-fashioned belief in a supertheory that would explain everything 
with a concomitant realization of the impossibility of a credible 
outside position, a Cartesian vantage point from which society can be 
observed. The complexity of Luhmann’s theory architecture derives in 
large part from what he (following Spencer Brown) would call the 
“unfolding” of this contradiction between the construction of a 
supertheory and the apparent unavailability of an objective point of 
view for doing so. Unlike contemporary philosophy, which sees this 
necessary but impossible project as part of the postmodern 
predicament, Luhmann has made original use of insights from 
cybernetics and evolutionary biology to develop a self-referential 
theory which conceptualizes modern society as a horizontally ordered 
concatenation of subsystems, each of which can make universalist 
                                                      
7 Soziale Systeme: Grundriß einer allgemeinen Theorie was published in 1984 by 
Suhrkampf in Frankfurt am Main. 
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claims within its own realm but none of which can impose such claims 
onto other functional domains. Thus, even while it aspires to explain 
all of society, social systems theory belongs to the subsystem of 
science, which means that the rest of society can function quite well 
without it, a conclusion which Luhmann lards with masterful self-
irony. 
It is not hard to see why such a perspective should generate 
resistance among American scholars, who are generally more 
receptive to immediate social concerns than their European 
counterparts. On the one hand, Luhmann’s taste for high theory and 
his attempt to position himself in relation to an “Old” European 
philosophical tradition squares badly with the postmodern defiance of 
grand narratives which permeates the U.S. academic world. This 
defiance also characterizes the New Americanists, whose critique of 
the myth and symbol school, for instance, derives its momentum 
largely from their refusal to summarize “America” in terms of a 
couple of unifying ideas (such as innocence), which for them 
indirectly serve to explain away deeper inequalities (the not so 
innocent treatment of minorities under the banner of freedom). On the 
other hand, Luhmann’s anti-essentialist design seems to go against 
what the New Americanists would label a “counterhegemonic” 
discourse, a counternarrative through which they hope to effectuate 
social change. Luhmann’s theory does not deny such forms of agency, 
but his systematic theorization of the self-implicative logic of society, 
a logic from which, as we noted, not even his own theory of society is 
exempt, implies that the revisionism of the New Americanists can 
only acquire meaning in relation to, by enveloping it within, the 
society against which it reacts.  
From the perspective of the New Americanists, Luhmann’s 
systems theory thus seems at once dangerously overambitious and not 
ambitious enough, which may at least in part indicate why it has 
hardly percolated in American theory debates. But, in line with 
Luhmann’s cybernetically-inspired language, such “limited 
connectivity” may at the same time contain the promise of 
communicative acceptance. I want to stress from the beginning, 
though, that by applying Luhmann’s systems theory to the New 
Americanists I do not mean to deny the legitimacy of their 
oppositionalism by suggesting that they would be somehow less 
radical than they claim to be. On the contrary, I hope to analyze this 
radical revisionism as an indispensable operational feature of modern 
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society. I want to approach this by resituating social systems theory in 
the familiar tradition of functionalism from which it emerged. Most 
Luhmann textbooks transmit his ideas rather dogmatically, thus 
naturalizing concepts and models that were meant to provoke new 
ways of approaching social theory. Pointing attention to systems 
theory’s connection to functionalism, a tradition well-known in the 
American social sciences, can make his theory more tangible even 
while indicating where it goes beyond some of the more problematic 
assumptions of traditional functionalism.   
A functionalist argument is normally regarded as a special 
type of causal explanation, whereby the consequences of an 
institutional or behavioral pattern indirectly serve to explain it. A well-
known example is that of a rain dance promoting group solidarity. 
While the dance ostensibly functions to appease the gods, its hidden 
function is to reinforce the tribal hierarchy. A valid functional 
argument thus needs to conform to two basic conditions. First, there 
has to be a degree of circularity. The ritual dance is indirectly 
sustained by its effects, i.e. the maintenance of peace in the tribe, 
which results in a reverse causal loop that keeps such traditions alive. 
What further sets functional reasoning off from other types of 
consequence explanations, such as those invoking individual aims, is 
the condition of latency. According to this criterion, a rain dance can 
only fulfill its solidarity-enhancing function if those performing it do 
so without realizing what it is really about. As the argument goes, if 
the dancers would find out that by performing such a ritual they were 
unwittingly strengthening the social order, the idiosyncrasy of 
individual intentions would start competing with the common good of 
maintaining solidarity. 
I have deliberately used a relatively simple example from 
early anthropology to bring out some of the problems involved in the 
functionalist paradigm, most of which have to do with its speculative 
or anti-empirical slant. After all, how can we ascertain whether a rain 
dance really serves the purpose that the ethnologist assigns to it? Why 
should such a ritual help to preserve the group (why, for instance, 
could it not do the exact opposite)? Perhaps we simply impute this 
function to the group assuming that what is, is right? And, even if it 
can be ascertained that there is indeed a reverse causal mechanism 
working underneath the surface, it still remains to be seen to what 
extent this feedback mechanism is indeed produced unintentionally 
and whether it really remains unrecognized. Such functional reasoning 
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thus adopts the kind of Cartesian viewpoint that according to 
postmodern thinkers can no longer be maintained. The emphasis on 
group stability as the ultimate functional requisite of clan society can 
be identified as an ideological ploy that denies its members any right 
to agency. This is a familiar charge leveled against Alfred Radcliffe-
Brown’s notion of the “ritual attitude” on which primitive cultures 
would depend for their survival.
8
 
Although functionalist theory has become much more 
sophisticated since the days of Radcliffe-Brown, most of the problems 
(both real and imagined) associated with it have not gone away. In the 
1960s, for instance, Talcott Parsons’s structural functionalism, which 
had dominated sociological theorizing for about two decades, came 
under heavy attack from C. Wright Mills and others on the assumption 
that, through its emphasis on system maintenance and equilibrium, the 
notorious Parsonian four-function model sanctioned rather than 
analyzed the established order at a time when the United States was 
assuming absolute world power.
9
 During the 1980s and 1990s, 
attempts have been made to rehabilitate Parsons by opening up his 
rather top-heavy theoretical framework to social change. This 
“neofunctionalist” turn, which has been relatively short-lived, can 
equally be interpreted in light of the persistent charge of conservatism. 
(Alexander, Neofunctionalism)
10
 In Germany, the Parsonian legacy 
has been kept alive thanks to Luhmann and Jürgen Habermas, both of 
whom have drawn extensively on structural functionalism. The label, 
however, has retained very negative connotations, as appears from the 
well-known Luhmann-Habermas debate in the early 1970s, whereby 
the latter accused the former of being a functionalist.
11
 
However, Luhmann’s 1984 masterpiece Soziale Systeme 
                                                      
8 Alfred R. Radcliffe-Brown. Structure and Function in Primitive Society. New York: 
The Free Press, 1965. 
9 Parsons distinguished four functional requisites or imperatives necessary for system 
maintenance: adaptation, goal attainment, integration, and latency. Together, these 
have become known as the AGIL scheme, which Parsons then further refined and 
differentiated to analyze diverse social phenomena. Parsons’s model was criticized by 
C. Wright Mills in The Sociological Imagination. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1959. 
10 Meanwhile, Alexander has already declared the end of this return to Parsons. See 
eofunctionalism and After. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1998. 
11 Jürgen Habermas and Niklas Luhmann. Theorie der Gesellschaft oder 
Sozialtechnologie: Was leistet die Systemforschung? Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
1971. 
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revealed that his brand of systems theory, even if it remains strongly 
indebted to Parsons’s structural functionalism, at the same time 
departs from it in significant ways.
12
 The first thing to note is that 
Luhmann shifts emphasis away from the maintenance of stability to 
the management of complexity. How, Luhmann asks, does modern 
society deal with the problem of (ever growing) complexity?
13
 
Controlling it from the top down seems futile. Instead of imposing a 
system of unilateral control, Luhmann argues that modern societies 
have developed sophisticated ways of channeling complexity through 
strategies of selection, differentiation and temporalization. That 
means, very simply, that complexity is countered by internalizing it, or 
by reproducing it on another level. The result is a state of “dynamic 
stability,” whereby the social system exerts control in paradoxical 
fashion by anticipating, as it were by inviting, its eventual contestation 
(Luhmann, Social Systems 49). This shift from stability to dynamic 
stability, or from continuity to contingency, presents a major step 
forward in relation those approaches which regarded class 
stratification as a “natural” fact of society.
14
    
What does all of this entail for functional methodology? 
Above, we defined functional arguments as special forms of causal 
argument, whereby the end (the hidden function) justifies the means 
(the item to be explained). The problem with this means/end logic of 
traditional functionalism was that it could never fully answer the 
question as to what it is, in the end, that justifies the end that justifies 
the means. Does the item become dysfunctional if it reaches its goal 
(stabilizing the group)? In response to such obstacles, Luhmann 
                                                      
12 Luhmann’s status as a highly innovative thinker became even more apparent in 
1997 after the appearance of the two-volume Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft 
(Suhrkamp), which remains as yet untranslated in the English language. 
13 The main focus of Luhmann’s systems theory is modern society, which he relates to 
the emergence of self-referential function systems (such as the economy, law, art, and 
so on) on the one hand and the development of distribution media (such as writing and 
print) on the other hand. Luhmann argues that these structural conditions, which 
started to manifest themselves in their full force around the eighteenth century, have 
not undergone such fundamental changes in recent times as to warrant the use of the 
label “postmodern”. 
14 For the functional theory of stratification, see Kingsley Davis and Wilbert Moore. 
“Some Principles of Stratification.” American Sociological Review 10 (1945): 242-49. 
I should add that by saying that stratification is not a functional necessity of modern 
society, Luhmann does not therefore assume that it does not exist. But it is no longer 
the primary form of differentiation.  
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adopts an anti-teleological approach, which envisions only one end, 
namely the end of the social as such, which is probably the only end 
which everybody would want to avoid. From this perspective, the aim 
of functional analysis is no longer merely to discover causalities, but 
above all to compare different but functionally equivalent solutions to 
the problem of society (which obviously only becomes a problem 
because there is not just one, ready-made solution). Put differently, the 
explanatory value of functional arguments no longer resides primarily 
in uncovering a kind of invisible hand pulling the strings of society, 
but rather in examining how society puts forward specific answers 
(which are equivalent, since all of them come from within society, 
which also means that all of them can in principle be replaced) to the 
question of its existence. The attention thus shifts from the 
determination of functions to the process of function attribution. In 
other words, causal arguments become subtypes of functional ones 
instead of the other way around. 
This shift from causalities to equivalences also leads us to 
redefine the condition of latency. One recurring problem in traditional 
functionalism was that the researcher can never really know for sure 
that society does not really know what it is not supposed to know. 
Luhmann addresses this issue by consigning psychic systems to the 
“environment” of the social, a drastic theoretical move that has often 
been misunderstood as a form of anti-individualism (it is, in fact, the 
exact opposite). In social systems theory, latency therefore no longer 
just refers to a lack of awareness on the part of individuals, but rather 
entails a lack of themes to push forward communication (Social 
Systems 335).
15
 In every society, there are things that cannot be 
communicated because they affect the very structure of that society. 
Each society thus creates its own latency needs. A hierarchical order 
will protect itself through counter-discourses that help it to let off 
steam but that do not, in general, constitute an alternative to that order 
(carnivals cannot last forever). In modern society, by contrast, 
alternatives are already abundantly present. As a matter of fact, its 
legitimacy depends on its capacity for offering equivalent solutions, 
                                                      
15 The elementary building block of society, for Luhmann, is communication. This is 
another major departure from Parsons, who based his theory on actions and their 
functional components. The communicative approach, at least on the level of theory, 
has the advantage of steering free from the thorny problem of intentionality. Whereas 
actions necessarily presuppose an ulterior design, communication can very well 
babble on without it.  
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for stimulating criticism. Put differently, all those things that pose a 
threat to a hierarchy constitute a condition of possibility for a 
horizontally structured society. What needs to be kept latent, in such a 
context, is not what keeps individuals from speaking out against 
domination but rather the selectivity of public opinion as such. 
The overall criticism directed against functionalism was that it 
largely ignored conflict and change. Even if these factors were 
recognized, they were often approached as “dysfunctional” for the 
equilibrium of the sociopolitical order. Social systems theory, by 
contrast, explicitly highlights the importance, even the productive 
potential, of paradoxes and contradictions in the formation and 
maintenance of modern society. The complexity of Luhmann’s prose 
style, so disconcerting and irritating to the uninitiated reader, thus 
needs to be understood in terms of his attempt to create a theoretical 
framework commensurate with the exigencies of an increasingly 
complex world society, which operates precisely on the basis of 
perpetual internal unrest. According to Luhmann, modern society 
constitutes a “self-substitutive order” (Social Systems 409). Simply 
put, this means that the social system protects itself against 
annihilation by including its own negation as a condition of 
possibility, by inviting its own replacement, which results in a 
remarkably high tolerance for uncertainty. The problem for such a 
self-substitutive order is no longer how to control dissent but how to 
exploit it, given that there are so many options available, all of them 
apparently equally valid.  
Conceptualizing modern society as a self-substitutive order 
has far-reaching implications for the role of the critic in it, which is 
where my discussion of systems theory reconnects to that of the New 
Americanists. The problematization of latency in the modern world 
signifies that virtually everything can become the object of critical 
scrutiny. The one thing that has to remain latent, in such a context, is 
the very bankruptcy of the idea that there are certain things that cannot 
be communicated. In a functionally differentiated order, such latencies 
(for instance, the mystery of the afterlife) can no longer self-evidently 
block critical inquiry since this would offend the premises of 
structural selection. This dehierarchization of the social, however, 
comes at the price of the decreasing social relevance of criticism. In a 
somewhat sardonic turn, Luhmann states that the modern critic 
becomes “radical in a peculiarly hopeless fashion” (Social Systems 
342). The authority of the critic no longer depends primarily on 
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uncovering latent truths, because such mechanisms of manifestation 
are already built into modern society’s operational structure. All that is 
left for the critic to do, it seems, is anticipate such self-falsificatory 
gestures by communicating his ignorance. 
 
American Studies as a Self-Substitutive Order 
 
The prominent European Americanist Winfried Fluck has described 
the revisionist program of the New Americanists in terms of a larger 
predicament of the humanities, which he relates to the 
professionalization of criticism and more broadly to the “cultural 
radicalism” ingrained in postmodern society. This radicalism, for 
Fluck, is the cause of the current plight of the humanities, for it means 
that professional advancement is only possible by negating or 
reinterpreting the claims of other critics, which therefore results in a 
hopeless fragmentation of meaning as every truth claim immediately 
gets absorbed or aborted by an institutional matrix geared toward 
dissent. Fluck identifies the New Americanist paradigm as a 
prominent instance of numerous attempts to overcome this 
fragmentation, all of which however unwittingly stir up the disease 
they set out to cure. In order to accomplish their revisionist goals, 
Fluck argues, these radical critics cannot but reproduce the operational 
structure that undergirds the humanities in the age of “expressive 
individualism,” which constantly disqualifies or de-futurizes the 
theories that are produced to understand its deeper meaning. Every 
critic is therefore doomed to “out-radicalize” his fellow-critics, thus 
constantly deferring final meanings and values (217).  
In this regard, it seems ironic that Fluck’s compelling analysis 
of the New Americanists’ revisionism appeared in Pease and 
Wiegman’s The Futures of American Studies, a volume in the New 
Americanist Duke series, which makes one wonder whether and to 
what degree Fluck’s diagnosis does not itself fall victim to the 
“paradoxical professional logic” that he identifies as the source of the 
current crisis in the humanities (211). Fluck takes care, however, to set 
his critique apart from that of, on the one hand, conservative critics 
who deplore the loss of the traditional canon and values (an impulse 
that Gerald Graff has identified as a peculiarly prevalent “humanist 
myth” in literary studies, by which he means the mistaken idea of a 
founding consensus), and, on the other hand, Neo-Marxist critics who 
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remain stuck in inadequate models of class analysis.
16
 As Fluck 
indicates, assuming that the radicalization of criticism can be 
attributed to class differences or market factors results in a “crude 
sociologist bias,” which he observes in the Bourdieu-inspired 
approach of John Guillory (224). Such an economic analysis, Fluck 
argues, does not solve the problem of escalating radicalism for it 
assigns political significance to a development which is in fact a 
consequence of a cultural development toward ever increasing 
dehierarchization and individuation.      
What Fluck fails to mention in his article is that there is in fact 
a worked-out theoretical apparatus in place that addresses these issues 
and avoids such problematic (at once too specific and too vague) 
terms as “individualism,” “professionalism,” or “culture”. By 
restricting his argument to the post-World War II period, and by rather 
intuitively positioning the U.S. academic world against that of Europe, 
Fluck neglects some of the larger issues involved, such as the 
operational autonomization of function systems apart from the 
economy or science, the explosive growth of these systems beyond the 
reach of the nation-state and its limited instruments for policing the 
social, and the development of worldwide distribution media. 
Moreover, his far from neutral rhetoric when describing the American 
critic’s move away from enlightenment values to a meaningless 
“white-collar race for distinction” betrays that his stance is perhaps 
closer to the conservative side of the debate, which pretends to counter 
the defects of professionalization through unspecified cure-all “returns 
to culture,” than he is ready to admit (214).
17
 Rather than pursuing this 
critique, however, I would like to contribute constructively to the 
debate by showing how social systems theory can amplify and 
strengthen Fluck’s evaluation of the New Americanists. Luhmann’s 
approach, which I have presented in rather too condensed fashion, can 
offer a highly reflexive, “polycontextural” (as opposed to a 
monocausal) framework for redescribing the New Americanists’ 
revisionism in terms of the functional toppling of society in 
modernity.    
To drive home my point of view, I want to concretize things 
                                                      
16 Gerald Graff, Professing Literature: An Institutional History. Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1987. 
17 The phrase “return to culture” is taken from Edward Said’s Culture and 
Imperialism. London: Vintage, 1994. xiii-iv. 
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somewhat by focusing attention on what I consider to be a 
conspicuous but at the same time fairly representative instance of the 
New Americanists’ counterhegemonic project. In his 2000 book 
Literary Culture and U.S. Imperialism, John Carlos Rowe, a professor 
of English at UCIrvine and a self-described spokesperson of the New 
American Studies, offers a broad-ranging interpretation of the ways in 
which American writers roughly between the late 18
th
 up to the mid-
20
th
 century have been implicated in U.S. imperialism, both on the 
American mainland and elsewhere.
18
 Following the lead of 
postcolonial thinkers such as Edward Said, Rowe reinterprets a 
number of established and less established American literary texts, 
from Charles Brockden Brown’s Wieland to Zora Neale Hurston’s Tell 
My Horse, in view of their complex relation to U.S. (neo-)colonialism 
during a period that was up until recently seldom associated with such 
ideological forces.
19
 Rowe’s project, therefore, is designed to make 
manifest the ways in which the selected works have been put to the 
service of, but have also reacted against, the burgeoning imperial 
ambitions of the young American nation.   
My concern is not with the quality of Rowe’s textual analyses, 
which are on the whole admirably executed and yield compelling 
insights. Rather, I am interested in the reasons as to why his book 
should center almost exclusively on what Fluck describes as the 
“possibility or impossibility of opposition” (217). The main objective 
of Literary Culture and U.S. Imperialism, Rowe states, is “to learn 
how to tell the difference between literary practices that serve or 
challenge the dominant ideology while recognizing how all cultural 
acts remain to some degree captives of their historical and thus 
ideological situations” (79). “[O]ur best teachers” as Rowe phrases it, 
are those authors (Melville, Twain, Du Bois as opposed to Brown, 
Poe, or Henry James, with a number of ambivalent cases in between) 
who recognize at once the need and the danger of opposing American 
hegemony and therefore knowingly anticipate their apparently 
inevitable incorporation into the ideological machinery of U.S. 
exceptionalism. For instance, Rowe states that Typee poses the first 
real “resistance” to American neocolonialism because Melville, unlike 
                                                      
18 John Carlos Rowe, Literary Culture and U.S. Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000. 
19 In the preface, Rowe describes his book as a prelude to another study dealing with 
the cultural implications of U.S. foreign policies in Southeast Asia around the time of 
the Vietnam War. To date, this study has not yet appeared. 
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others, “recognizes the difficulty of combating forms of cultural 
imperialism at home and abroad that rely on the very rhetorical 
powers that are the resources of the imaginative writer” (17). Twain’s 
vigorous anti-imperialism, by contrast, would have instilled in him a 
belief in universal democracy through which he “unwittingly 
anticipat[ed]” American neo-imperalist practices that use such 
democratic ideals to justify territorial expansion (18). 
Rowe takes pains to differentiate his approach from that of 
deconstructionist and other textual critics, whom he blames for failing 
to take into account variables such as sexuality, gender, race, and class 
in the production of culture. Arguing that we are bound to make 
judgments no matter what, Rowe does not hesitate to issue bold claims 
regarding the involvement of certain authors in the American imperial 
project, or even to extend the history of that project into the colonial 
period, as when he argues that the modern reader “must recognize the 
secret complicity” between Brown’s gothic romances and the 
genocides perpetrated by the British on Native Americans during the 
French and Indian Wars (39). Even while his natural addressee 
remains the American nation (“our best teachers”), Rowe spreads the 
burden of U.S. imperial violence over three centuries of European 
presence in the Americas. The problem with such sweeping arguments 
is that it becomes very difficult to ascertain whether the critic does not 
project his own concerns onto the object of study. Is it really true that 
Brown’s fiction “helps distort and disguise” colonial massacres (28)? 
Or, why, alternatively, should it be that Du Bois “comes closest … to 
understanding U.S. imperialism” (196)? 
One could venture that Rowe’s book is guided by what the 
political philosopher Philippe Van Parijs at a certain point identified as 
the “principle of suspicion” inherent in traditional functionalism, 
meaning a tendency to consistently read certain phenomena 
symptomatically in terms of their hidden meanings (Van Parijs 129). 
The problem with this principle of suspicion is that, in the end, it tends 
to become itself highly susceptible to suspicion. The critic is faulted, 
not so much for having poked at power structures that were supposed 
to remain hidden, but for not having done enough to point out what to  
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other critics seems manifest.
20
 The quasi-universalization of the 
principle of suspicion thus presupposes a concomitant expansion of an 
underlying semantics of ignorance.
21
 In his Observations on 
Modernity, Luhmann defined the modern expert as “someone who, 
when asked questions he cannot answer, can be led back to a mode of 
uncertainty” (70). By this, Luhmann means that, in modern society, a 
critical judgment can only find acceptance when it can (at least in 
principle) be contested, revised, or negated, in other words when it is 
improbable. It is this communicative deficit or ingrown uncertainty at 
the core of the critical enterprise that drives it forward and ultimately 
legitimizes it. 
I claim that Rowe fails to capture this self-substitutive 
dynamic because of his emphasis on creating a counterdiscourse to 
American imperialism. Note, for instance, how he describes the role 
of criticism in his chapter on Henry Adams:  
 
The ideological means by which a society refuses to accept responsibility 
for dominating and exploiting others must always be central to our cultural 
criticism, insofar as the ultimate aim of such criticism is an understanding 
that brings about social change. (166) 
 
In a context where change is not so much an obstacle to but a 
constitutive requirement, merely calling for change (yes we can!) does 
not therefore upset the established order, which establishes itself 
precisely through its continual replacement. This is not to say that 
anything goes or to trivialize concerted efforts at reducing inequalities, 
but rather to point attention to the fact that in a complex world society 
structural conditions prevail that can mobilize enormous amounts of 
resistance without disintegrating. Greater “understanding” does not 
help here because there is no vested interest in keeping things hidden, 
or, rather, things are kept hidden through the demand for greater 
                                                      
20 Indeed, as it appears, Rowe is by no means immune from his own anti-imperialist 
critique. In his article “Imperial Literary Culture,” Paul Giles wonders whether 
Rowe’s argument “might not in itself constitute a more emollient form of American 
cultural imperialism.” (137) 
21 By a semantics of ignorance I do not mean a lack of knowledge on the part of the 
scholar but rather a lack of communicative themes that indirectly urges on 
communication. In this sense, ignorance (or what Luhmann calls communicative 
latency) constitutes a necessary condition for an institution to establish itself. If we 
could completely unravel what the great works of American literature are all about, 
we would have to close the books and take up another profession. 
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openness. Rowe surely comprehends this paradox but, in his 
insistence on the all-pervasiveness of U.S. power, he fails to grasp its 
deeper implications for modern society as a whole. 
It is remarkable that, in the above quote, Rowe rather 
negligently juxtaposes terms like “our” and “others,” terms that he 
promises to question by showing how they are constructed through 
literary culture. Social systems theory can lift Rowe’s approach to a 
higher level of reflexivity by redescribing such counterconcepts 
(“America” versus the rest) as part of the self-referential semantics 
through which a social system emerges and reconstructs itself. Rather 
than once more “out-radicalizing” existing position-takings, I want to 
stress what connects the “New” and the “Old” Americanists. Where 
the so-called old guard reacted against the “Anglocentrism” of earlier 
critics such as Barrett Wendell and Charles F. Richardson, the so-
called “postnational” critics of today oppose the “Eurocentrism” or 
even “Americocentrism” of the earlier generations. What has 
remained intact in spite of these “paradigm dramas,” as Donald Pease 
would call them, is the self-corrective incentive structure at the basis 
of American Studies as a field, which has from the beginning defined 
itself ex negativo by opposing earlier versions of itself, like a snake 
sloughing off its old skins. Before we cast off the “New Americanists” 
in favor of yet another renaissance, therefore, there may be some 
value in focusing more attention on the societal conditions that 
produce such disciplinary reversals to begin with. Reading Luhmann 
would be a good start. 
The Semantics of Self-Denial 149 
 
Works Cited 
 
Alexander, Jeffrey C. eofunctionalism. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1985.  
---. eofunctionalism and After. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1998. 
Bercovitch, Sacvan and Jehlen, Myra, eds. Ideology and Classic American Literature. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. 
Boyden, Michael. Predicting the Past: The Paradoxes of American Literary History. 
Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2009. 
Crews, Frederick. “Whose American Renaissance?” ew York Review of Books 35.16 
(October 27, 1988): 68-81. 
Davis, Kingsley and Moore, Wilbert. “Some Principles of Stratification.” American 
Sociological Review 10 (1945): 242-49.  
Elliot, Emory, gen. ed. Columbia Literary History of the United States. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1988. 
Fluck, Winfried. “The Humanities in the Age of Expressive Individualism and 
Cultural Radicalism.” The Futures of American Studies. Ed. Donald E. 
Pease and Robyn Wiegman. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002. 
211-230. 
Foerster, Norman, ed. The Reinterpretation of American Literature: Some 
Contributions toward the Understanding of Its Historical Development. 
New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1928. 
Giles, Paul. “Imperial Literary Culture.” ovel: A Forum on Fiction 35.1 (2001): 136-
138. 
Graff, Gerald. Professing Literature: An Institutional History. Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1987. 
Habermas, Jürgen and Niklas Luhmann. Theorie der Gesellschaft oder 
Sozialtechnologie: Was leistet die Systemforschung? Frankfurt/Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1971. 
Lewis, R. W. B. The American Adam: Innocence, Tragedy, and Tradition in the 
ineteenth Century. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955.  
Luhmann, Niklas. Social Systems. Transl. John Bednarz, Jr. with Dirk Baecker. 
Stanford University Press, 1995. 
---. Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1997. 
---. Observations on Modernity. Transl. William Whobrey. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1998. 
Matthiessen, F. O. American Renaissance: Art and Expression in the Age of Emerson 
and Whitman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1941. 
Michaels, Walter Benn and Donald E. Pease, eds. The American Renaissance 
Reconsidered: Selected Papers from the English Institute, 1982-1983. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985.  
Mills, C. Wright. The Sociological Imagination. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1959. 
Newfield, Christopher. The Emerson Effect: Individualism and Submission in 
America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. 
Parrington, Vernon L. Main Currents in American Thought. 3 Vols. New York: 
Harcourt, Brace & World, 1927-30.  
Pease, Donald E. Visionary Compacts: American Renaissance Writings in Cultural 
Context. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987. 
150                                                                                      Michael Boyden 
 
Pease, Donald E., ed. The ew Americanists: Revisionary Interventions in the 
Americanist Canon. Boundary 2. 17.1 (1990). 
---. Revisionary Interventions in the Americanist Canon. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1994. 
Radcliffe-Brown, Alfred R. Structure and Function in Primitive Society. New York: 
The Free Press, 1965. 
Reynolds, David S. Beneath the American Renaissance: The Subversive Imagination 
in the Age of Emerson and Melville. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988. 
Rowe, John Carlos. At Emerson’s Tomb: The Politics of Classic American Literature. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1997. 
---. Literary Culture and U.S. Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
Said, Edward. Culture and Imperialism. London: Vintage, 1994. 
Spiller, Robert E., gen. ed. Literary History of the United States. 3 Vols. New York: 
Macmillan, 1948.  
Spiller, Robert E. “A Letter to American Literary Historians.” Milestones in American 
Literary History. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1977. 139-142. 
Van Parijs, Philippe. Evolutionary Explanation in the Social Sciences: An Emerging 
Paradigm. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1981. 
